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Abstract
This paper analyses the endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asym-
metric firms. Coalition partners enjoy perfect spillovers from technology advancements by
their coalition partners, but each firm determines its R&D investment level non-cooperatively
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1 Introduction
In this paper we are interested in analyzing the endogenous formation of technology sharing part-
nerships, or coalitions, in industries with a limited number of firms. In terms of the treatment in
competition policy cases, R&D mergers or Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) are treated as excep-
tion from the prohibition of cooperation (e.g., Article 81 in EU Treaty of Rome, which deals with
agreements among firms). The primary reason for this is that there is a public good aspect to
R&D which may make it difficult to achieve socially optimal levels of R&D activity if focusing ex-
clusively on non-cooperative R&D. RJVs can take various forms, ranging from simple information
sharing arrangements with non-cooperative investment decisions by separate R&D units, to fully
integrated R&D units where investment decisions are made to maximize joint profits.
An important aspect of public policy with respect to R&D in many countries is the focus on
how to increase R&D levels to the OECD average.1 Although this is a useful starting point, the
total level of R&D is not necessarily the most appropriate measure of success as the characteristics
of the R&D intensive industries also matter. The present analysis is exclusively focused on firms’
privately financed R&D investments, and we do not look at R&D undertaken and financed by
public funds. Consequently, the R&D levels we observe in the context of the present model is only
half the picture. As we show below, the equilibrium coalition outcome is the least desirable outcome
if the main objective is to increase R&D investments. This would imply that if competition policy
authorities allow such a coalition to go through, the public sector will need to finance an even
larger share of the total R&D investments to achieve a higher level of investments. This may quite
possibly be seen as good news for universities and research institutes.
There are three firms in our model that all have different ex ante levels of marginal cost
in producing the final product. The firms undertake R&D investments which we model as a
type of process innovation, where the investments reduce the marginal cost (of producing the
final product) for both the investing firms and that of its coalition partners.2 The type of R&D
undertaken should be thought of in terms of implementation of new technology rather than the
discovery of new processes, since there is no uncertainty with respect to the outcome of the R&D
investment. The three firms compete in quantities in the product market, and we assume that there
is no cooperation other than the potential to share technological advancements among coalition
partners.3 We consider a simple type of R&D cooperation, and focus on coalition formation with
1The Norwegian government has discussed this in a White Paper: St. Prp 51 (2002-2003) Virkemidler for et
innovativt og nyskapende næringsliv (Innovasjonsmeldingen).
2 Some stylised facts on what is termed "informal knowhow sharing" in various industries can be found in von
Hippel (1987). Carter (1989) investigates the economic incentives behind sharing of technical information.
3For the analysis of the sharing of private cost and demand information in oligopolies, see for instance Fried
(1984), Gal-Or (1985, 1986), Shapiro (1986), Vives (1984), and Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite and Suzumura (1990).
Whereas these papers consider the exchange of information in asymmetric information models which affects the
firms’ perception of the competition, the present analysis is concerned with exchange of information that directly
affects the marginal cost of production of the partners to a coalition. The link is, as pointed out by Eaton and
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technology sharing in a static game. By this we mean that coalition partners benefit fully from
any technological advancements that their partner undertakes, but the investment decisions are
taken non-cooperatively. There is no benefit for the firm outside the arrangement of the R&D
undertaken by the coalition partners. Thus, there is perfect spillover within the coalition and zero
spillover to the outsider. Eaton and Eswaran (1997) show in the context of a supergame that
trading of technical information can be sustained as an equilibrium. The mechanism to sustain
sharing is through punishments (ejection from the coalition if providing empty information). The
trading of technical information may reduce the marginal cost of production for the partners of a
coalition in a similar way to the present analysis, but in Eaton and Eswaran (1997) firms have ex
ante identical marginal cost of production, which implies that all firms in a coalition have identical
marginal cost when all relevant information is traded in the coalition.
This set-up could also be interpreted as one in which patent holders enter into a patent pool,
with each member of the pool being allowed to (costlessly) utilize cost reducing technology ad-
vancements made by their partners.4 The endogenous formation of the coalition, or pool, will then
determine the scope of the pool (i.e., how many, if any, pool partners will there be). There is also
some resemblance to the literature on open source, which by some authors is termed collective
invention.5 The idea behind the sharing of technology advancements in the present analysis also
bears some resemblance to the theory of club goods, where the members of the club can benefit
from all the facilities of the club.6
We are ruling out the possibility of a monopoly coalition, and focus only on the potential out-
comes of either some coalition with two firms or the case with no coalition. In addition, we attempt
to rank the various outcomes in terms of impact on industry profit, consumers’ surplus and ulti-
mately on welfare. Although our primary focus is not on mergers, we make use of the methodology
developed by Horn and Persson (2001) to characterize the equilibrium coalition structure and to
investigate the impact on R&D investment levels of the potential outcomes.7
The equilibrium coalition is a result of a cooperative bargaining process in which firms can
communicate freely with each other and are free to write binding contracts with each other (Horn
and Persson, 2001).8 One main feature of this approach is that the lack of restrictions on the
Eswaran (1997), that the information that is exchanged is both cases non-rivalrous.
4For analysis of the welfare effects of patent pools in a different setting see Lerner and Tirole (2004).
5On open source see, e.g., Lerner and Tirole (2005). The term collective invention is often attributed to Allen
(1983) and describes "the free exchange of information about new techniques and plant designs among firms in an
industry".
6Buchanan (1965) is the seminal article on the theory of club goods.
7Barros (1998) also considers endogenous mergers with a similar set of criteria to determine the equilibrium
market structure. Vasconcelos (2006) considers endogeous mergers in endogenous sunk cost industries to derive
upper bounds on concentration.
8Horn and Persson (2001) cites various work on endogenous mergers, and note that there seems to be three
different paths to analysing endogenous mergers. They give an account of the pros and cons of the different
approaches: i) Model the process as a normal form game with bids and asking prices (Kamien and Zang, 1990,
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contracts between coalition partners implies that the free-riding problem becomes less pronounced,
and one would expect that the solutions with respect to the equilibrium market structure becomes
more efficient. We show that the equilibrium coalition is a coalition between the two most efficient
firms. It is not necessarily obvious that the two most efficient (and hence) largest firms would
choose to share their technology advancements. Our model predicts a result along the line of "keep
your friends close, but your enemies closer". One might initially be tempted to deduce that the
more efficient firm would prefer to go into partnership with the least efficient firm, or that the
two least efficient firms would join forces to be able to outcompete the ex ante most efficient firm.
This, however, turns out not to be the case here. In addition, the analysis of mergers often reveals
conflicting interests between social and private merger incentives. This is, in particular, due to the
fact that the mergers that are chosen endogenously are mergers that result in high industry profit,
which is often deemed to be incompatible with high consumers’ surplus. In the present analysis,
however, the endogenously chosen coalition is also the coalition that maximizes welfare and the
coalition that achieves the highest industry profit is also the coalition that results in the highest
total output.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present the basic model and the
non-coalition outcome. In section 3, 4 and 5 we analyze the three possible coalition structures. In
section 6 we compare the R&D investment levels under the different technology sharing coalitions,
and in section 7 we endogenize the coalition formation. In section 8 we look at welfare aspects of
the different coalitions, and in section 9 we make some concluding remarks.
2 The benchmark model
There are three firms indexed by i, j and k who produce a homogenous product for which the
inverse demand function is
p = 1− (qi + qj + qk) (1)
where p is the product price, and qa is the quantity produced by firm a. The initial marginal
production cost faced by each firm is ca = θac for a =, i, j, k, and where c > 0 and θk > θj > θi. At
stage 1, each firm has the possibility of investing in R&D in order to reduce this marginal cost; the
cost of R&D is the same for each firm: k(xa) =
γx2a
2 , where xa is the amount of R&D undertaken
by firm a. Marginal cost is affected by R&D in the following way:
bca = θac− xa (2)
1991), ii) Merger formation as a non-cooperative bargaining process (Chatterjee et al, 1993, and Ray and Vohra,
1999), and iii) Merger formation as a cooperative game (Horn and Persson, 2001). The present paper follows the
third approach.
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where bca is post R&D cost for firm a. We assume initially that there are no spillovers from one
firm’s investment to the others. At stage 2 the firms compete in quantities in the product market.
In contrast to the majority of the literature on strategic R&D investments where there typically
are imperfect spillovers between investing firms, we consider a setting with either zero or perfect
spillovers.9 The firms that enter into a coalition enjoy perfect spillovers, whereas the outsider
can only improve on own costs through his own investments. The coalition partners operate as a
form of Research Joint Venture (RJV) in which the partners share their technology advancements
perfectly, but they choose both quantity and R&D spending non-cooperatively.10
To determine the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game we work backwards from
stage 2, assuming that the firms act non-cooperatively at each stage. The maximization problem
of firm i is
max
qi
πi = (1− (qi + qj + qk)− θic+ xi)qi (3)
Given the amount of R&D undertaken at stage 1, the quantity produced by each firm at stage
2 is:
qi =




(1− c (3θj − θi − θk) + 3xj − xi − xk)
4
qk =
(1− c (3θk − θj − θi) + 3xk − xj − xi)
4
giving firm i a profit of πi = q2i in the product market. Firm i thus chooses its amount of R&D
to solve the following problem:
max
xi




The non-cooperative level of R&D by each firm in an interior equilibrium can then be deter-
mined to be
9The seminal paper on strategic R&D investments is d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). Similar issues are
analysed by Suzumura (1992), Leahy and Neary (1997), and Brod and Shivakumar (1997).
10 In the terminology of Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992) we are analysing RJV with competition.
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xk =
3 (2γ − 3− 2γc (3θk − θj − θi) + 3θkc)
(8γ − 3) (2γ − 3) (6)
xj =
3 (2γ − 3− 2γc (3θj − θi − θk) + 3θjc)
(8γ − 3) (2γ − 3)
xi =
3 (2γ − 3− 2γc (3θi − θj − θk) + 3θic)
(8γ − 3) (2γ − 3)
X = xi + xj + xk =
3 (3− c(θi + θj + θk))
(8γ − 3)
where the second-order condition for each player’s maximization and the stability condition
is fulfilled for γ > 32 , making the sign of the denominator in (6) positive.
11 The first order
conditions for the maximization of (5) yield the following relationship between quantity and R&D
of firm a = i, j, k: qa =
2γ
3 xa.It is immediately apparent from (4) and (6) that qi > qj > qk and
xi > xj > xk so that the most efficient firm at the outset (firm i) does the most R&D and produces
the most output in the interior equilibrium. For the interior solution to be valid it must be the
case that the R&D and output of the least productive firm must be positive (qk > 0, xk > 0) and
the ex post cost of the most efficient firm likewise: θic − xi > 0. This yields the following set of
conditions:
θi >
6cγ(θj + θk) + 3(2γ − 3)
4cγ(4γ − 3) (7)
θk <
(2γ − 3) + 2γc(θi + θj)
3c(2γ − 1)
Hence the interior equilibrium exists if firm i (k) is not too (in)efficient in relation to the rivals.
Substituting (4) and (6) into (5) reveals the total profits for the three firms in this equilibrium as
Πi =














where Πi > Πj > Πk in equilibrium. The proportionality factor
γ(8γ−9)
18 is strictly positive for
all permissible values for γ.
The difference in the R&D of two firms that are adjacent in terms of cost, say i and j, is
xi − xj =
3c(θj − θi)
2γ − 3 (9)
11On the stability condition in oligopoly models in general see Seade (1980). For their use in R&D models see
Henriques (1990).
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so that the difference in R&D is proportional to the difference in ex ante efficiency. The
relationship for the ex post costs of these two firms is consequently:
bcj − bci = (θjc− xj)− (θic− xi) = 2γc(θj − θi)
2γ − 3 ≡ αc(θj − θi) (10)
where the proportionality coefficient α is the same for the comparison between adjacent firms
i and j, and j and k. Since α > 1, there is a larger relative distance between the firms’ marginal
cost after R&D takes place.12
Later in the paper, we present a parameterized example in which θi = 1, θj = 2, θk = 3. The
existence conditions in (7) in this case amount to requiring:
2γ − 3)
3(4γ − 3) > c >
3(2γ − 3)
2γ (8γ − 21)
The area in which the interior equilibrium is valid is drawn in Figure 1. Here, combinations of
c and γ below the concave line secure that xk > 0 whilst combinations above the convex one yield
ex post positive costs for the most efficient firm: c− xi > 0.
[Figure 1 about here]
3 Technology sharing between the most efficient firms
We now suppose that the two most efficient firms, i and j, agree to share the results of their
independent R&D in the form of a technology sharing consortium. Each firm still decides how
much to spend on R&D independently of the others, but i and j now get the full benefit of each
others’ advancement. The cost reducing R&D can be thought of as complementary R&D. There
is, as before, no spillover to or from the outside firm k. Hence the ex post marginal production
costs of the firms are given by
bciji = θic− xi − xj (11)bcijj = θjc− xi − xjbcijk = θkc− xk
where bcija indicates the marginal cost post of R&D expenditures of firm a = i, j, k given that i
and j share technology advancements.
The profit levels of the firms before the R&D stage are given by
12The ex ante difference in costs is c (θj − θi).
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Πiji =



















The interior R&D expenditures in equilibrium are then
xiji =
γ (2γ − 3) + 3c (θj + (γ − 1) θi) + 7cγ (θi − θj)− 2cγ2 (3θi − θj − θk)
γ(8γ2 − 17γ + 6) (12)
xijj =
γ (2γ − 3) + 3c (θi + (γ − 1) θj)− 7cγ (θi − θj)− 2cγ2 (3θj − θi − θk)
γ(8γ2 − 17γ + 6)
xijk =
3γ − 6 (1− θkc)− 3cγ (3θk − θi − θj)
(8γ2 − 17γ + 6)
where the denominator in these expressions is positive by the stability condition (requiring γ >








< 0). The effect that the technology partner’s efficiency has on own R&D depends
upon the size of γ: for 3 > γ > 1.678,
∂xijj
∂θi
< 0 and for γ > 3 we have that
∂xijj
∂θi
> 0 with the effect
of j’s efficiency on i’s R&D defined symmetrically. To explain these effects is it useful to consider






1 + c(−3θi + θj + θk) + 2xijj − x
ij
k



















In the following we shall assume a fixed relationship between the initial efficiency levels of the





< 0 measured along i’s reaction function; an increase in θi leads to a negative shift
in the R&D reaction function of firm i inducing it to behave less aggressively. At the same time
the reaction function of the outside firm k shifts positively. The total effect of an increase in θi on
j’s reaction function is parameter specific; when γ > 2.68 j’s reaction function shifts positively as
its partner becomes less efficient, whilst the opposite is the case for 2.68 > γ > 1.678. Hence, when
γ is large an increase in θi will reduce x
ij
i directly, but the positive shift in j’s reaction function will
counter some of this effect since the R&D expenditures of the partners are strategic complements.
At the same time the positive shift in the outsider’s R&D reaction function further reduces xiji
13The same assumption of a fixed relationship between ex ante efficiency levels is used by Straume (2003).
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since the R&D efforts of i and k are strategic substitutes. The overall effect of i’s reduction in
efficiency is a reduction in xiji . When γ is small there is a negative shift in j’s reaction function
which further reduces i’s R&D. The effects that an increase in θi has on the partner firm’s R&D
depend upon γ similarly. When γ is sufficiently large, the positive shift in j’s reaction function
outweighs the negative effect of i’s R&D reduction. If γ is small then j’s R&D reaction function
moves negatively reinforcing the effect of i’s reduced R&D.











< 0. Here it is the case that the R&D expenditures
of each coalition partner is a strategic substitute for that of the outsider. Total analysis of the
system in (13) reveals that an increase in θk causes a negative shift in k’s R&D reaction function,
and a positive shift in that of the insiders. Hence the insiders’ R&D increases whilst that of the


















for all permissible values of γ. Hence the firm that is most efficient initially will undertake more
R&D than the less efficient partner, but since all technology advancements are shared among the
coalition partners the gap in the R&D levels of the two inside firms is smaller than in the no-
coalition case (see (9)). Other relative comparisons rest on the specific relationship between the
three efficiency parameters so we now focus on the parametric example: θi = 1, θj = 2, θk = 3.
This yields the following R&D levels in equilibrium:
xiji =
¡
3c− 3γ − 4cγ + 2γ2 + 4cγ2
¢
γ(8γ2 − 17γ + 6) (14)
xijj =
¡
13cγ − 3γ − 3c+ 2γ2 − 4cγ2
¢
γ(8γ2 − 17γ + 6)
xijk =
3 (γ − 6cγ + 6c− 2)
(8γ2 − 17γ + 6)
In all of the coalition cases that we consider, there is a simple relationship between quantities,
total profits, and R&D expenditure in equilibrium. Suppose that two firms (call them m and
n) cooperate on R&D whilst firm p is outside. Then equilibrium quantities and total profit in




























For this equilibrium to be valid when i and j are the insiders, the R&D efforts, quantities, ex
post marginal costs, and profits of all three firms must be non-negative. Figure 2 delineates the
parameter values that are consistent with this equilibrium as areas I, II and III; the equations
of lines A, B, C and D are given in the appendix.
[Figure 2 about here]
Parameter combinations above and to the right of line A ensure that the ex post marginal
cost of the most efficient firm i is positive (and hence that of the partner j will also be positive);
the condition ensuring that the ex post cost of k is positive does not bind and is not drawn in the
figure. Combinations below line B yield xijk > 0, and here the other firms’ R&D levels are also
positive. It is also easy to check that the same conditions that ensure positive R&D expenditures





k > 0. The intersection of A and B defines γ = 5 as the lowest value of this parameter




j > 0 whilst in III




j > 0. Hence we
have xijk = x
ij




i along line D. It can easily be verified that profit is positive
in areas I, II and III.
To explain the relative sizes of the R&D efforts, it is again instructive to consider the gross
changes in the R&D reaction functions in (13) that are caused by changes in the parameters c
and γ. It can be determined that the R&D reaction functions of j and k shift negatively when c
increases, with that of k showing the most negative change. The R&D reaction function of i shifts
positively. Consider a point on line C in Figure 2 that is consistent with equilibrium; here xijj = x
ij
k .
Now increase c, keeping γ fixed so that we move into area I. This shifts the reaction functions of
j and k negatively, but the latter moves most. Hence xijj increases above x
ij
k . Correspondingly,
reducing c from a point on C, into area II, increases xijk most. A parallel argument can be made
for the comparison between xiji and x
ij
k in areas II and III.
Since firms i and j share the results of their R&D, the relative difference in their efficiency
levels is also preserved ex post. The difference in ex post marginal cost for the coalition partners is
simply the ex ante difference c, and since xi > xj , where xi is defined by (6), it can be shown that
the difference in ex post marginal costs between the coalition partners is lower than the benchmark
case of no coalition. The partner firms manage to gain an additional advantage over the outsider






m and n are in a coalition and firm p is the outsider. This is the case in the equilibrium discussed
here. Hence, the technology sharing arrangement between the two most efficient firms serves to
further disadvantage the less efficient rival.
The intuition behind the results can be explained as follows: The R&D effort of the two
coalition partners are strategic complements due to perfect spillovers, which lead to lower levels of
investments for both the partners compared to the no-coalition case. Furthermore, since spillovers
are perfect and the R&D costs are convex, the most efficient firm which invests the most in the
no-coalition case will face a stronger free-riding effect than the coalition partner and will reduce
its investment level more than its partner. This explains why the difference in investment levels
between firms i and j in the no-coalition is higher than in the coalition case. For the partners, the
R&D effort of the outsider is perceived as a strategic substitute to the partners’ effort, and since
the coalition partners reduce their overall investment level this implies that the outsider invests
more relative to the coalition partners than in the benchmark case. The outsider, in this case firm
k, still invests less than in the no-coalition case, but the difference in investment level relative to






− (xj − xk) being
negative.
4 Technology sharing between the most and least efficient
firms
Suppose now that firms i and k join together in the technology sharing arrangement whilst j is
outside the arrangement. In the parameterized example, marginal costs after R&D are now given
by




6c− 3γ − 11cγ + 2γ2 + 4cγ2
¢
γ(8γ2 − 17γ + 6) (18)
xikj =
3 (2c− 1) (2− γ)
(8γ2 − 17γ + 6)
xikk =
¡
−6c− 3γ + 23cγ + 2γ2 − 12cγ2
¢
γ(8γ2 − 17γ + 6)
and the quantities and profits follow (15) and (16).
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The conditions that guarantee the existence of this equilibrium are presented in Figure 3 as











k . In both cases, the
relative ranking of the three firms in terms of ex post marginal cost is the same as at the outset:bcikk > bcikj > bciki . The technology sharing arrangement does, however, allow the least efficient firm
to close the gap on the outsider since bcikk −bcikj < c where c is the initial gap in efficiency. The most






The intuition behind these results are essentially the same as described above. The outsider,
firm j, has stronger incentives to invest in cost reducing R&D than the insiders. This is due
to the fact that the insiders face free-riding issues and strategic complementarity between their
investments, which reduces their investments and reduces the investment of the ex ante most
efficient firm most. Since the insiders’ investment and that of the outsider are strategic substitutes,
the reduction in the coalition partners’ investments results in higher investment by the outsider.
The reason why the outsider may, for some parameter values, invest more than the most efficient
insider is that for some levels of the initial marginal cost, c, the percentage reduction in ex post
marginal cost due to R&D is sufficiently large.
5 Coalition between the two least efficient firms
The final possibility that we consider is one in which the least efficient firms, j and k, agree to
share the results of their R&D, with the most efficient firm outside of the arrangement. Ex post
costs are then
bcjki = c− xjki (19)bcjkk = 3c− xjkj − xjkkbcjkj = 2c− xjkj − xjkk
with equilibrium R&D:
xjki =
3 (2c+ γ + 2cγ − 2)
8γ2 − 17γ + 6 (20)
xjkj =
¡
3c− 3γ − cγ + 2γ2 − 4cγ2
¢
γ (8γ2 − 17γ + 6)
xjkk =
¡
16cγ − 3γ − 3c+ 2γ2 − 12cγ2
¢
γ (8γ2 − 17γ + 6)
14Along E in this figure we have xikk = 0, G denotes c
ik




j . The equations for these loci
are given in the appendix.
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Again, equilibrium quantities and profits follow the pattern in (15) and (16).
Again, considering the constraints that allow this equilibrium leads to Figure 4, and parameter
combinations in areas V I and V II which represent the constraints xjkk > 0 (below locus J in











k so that the coalition partners lose
ground to the most efficient firm in terms of ex post cost in spite of the fact that they share their
new knowledge. Hence bcjkk > bcjkj > bcjki in this area.15 In V II we find that xjki < xjkj + xjkk
so that the coalition partners gain relative to the outsider, but they do not catch up completely:bcjkk > bcjkj > bcjki here also.
6 Comparison of R&D levels
In this section we look at the relative properties of the four cases considered. The four figures
make it clear that the cases hold for different sets of parameter values, and that any comparison
between the cases must take this into account. Comparing the expression that underlie Figures
1-4 reveals that the area of existence for the case in which the most efficient firms cooperate is
encompassed by that of all other cases, and hence the equilibria exist collectively for
γ − 2
6(γ − 1) > c >
2(2γ − 3)
8γ2 − 17γ − 3
One can determine that the relationship between the total amounts of R&D undertaken is







so that it undertakes the most R&D in the stand-alone situation. Of the cooperative solutions
it conducts most R&D as an outsider to a technology sharing partnership. For the intermediate




j . For the least efficient firm the





k . Furthermore when c is sufficiently large
16 then xijk > x
ik
k .
The level of the ex ante cost difference, c, plays an important role in the analysis. The compar-
ative static results for R&D expenditures show that the equilibrium level of investment is affected










15This is the case for for c > γ
22γ−9 .
16 Specifically c > γ(γ−3)
6γ2+5γ−6 .
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for all h, where h denotes the type of coalition; h = {ij, ik, jk}. Thus, the most efficient firm
will in all of the coalition cases increase expenditure on R&D when the ex ante cost difference
increases.17 This is also the case when firms operate without technology sharing arrangements.
Since both quantity and profits are proportional to R&D expenditure, the comparative statics with
respect to changes in c will have the same signs as (21). The reason for this seemingly unintuitive
comparative statics results is due to the fact that when c increases firms become more asymmetric
ex ante, and our specification of the asymmetry between firms implies that for each unit of increase
in c the marginal cost of firm j increases two-fold and firm firm k the increase is three-fold. This
implies that ex ante most efficient firm enjoys a substantially larger percentage reduction in ex
post marginal cost from any given R&D investment, and hence the results in (21).
7 Equilibrium technology sharing arrangement
In order to establish which, if any, technology sharing arrangement would arise endogenously,
we need to compare industry profit for the different coalitions. The arrangement that yields the
highest level of industry profit will be the chosen coalition, provided that this structure awards the
coalition partners higher profit than the default outcome; i.e., the sum of profit for the coalition
partners in the absence of a technology sharing arrangement. This ensures that the coalition cannot
be broken by an offer from an outsider, and that the partners would enter the coalition voluntarily
given the status quo represented by the initial situation.18 Let us define ∆1 ≡ Πij − Πik and
∆2 ≡ Πij −Πjk, where Πst ≡ Πsti +Πstj +Πstk is the industry profit with a coalition between firms
s and t, for s, t = i, j, k with i 6= j 6= k. It can be shown that the following holds:
∆1 =
c (2γ − 1)
¡
cγ2 (200γ − 429) + c (306γ − 54) + γ2 (40γ − 54)
¢
2γ (8γ2 − 17γ + 6)2
> 0 (22)
∆2 = −
2cγ (2c− 1) (20γ − 27) (2γ − 1)
(8γ2 − 17γ + 6)2
> 0 (23)
This implies that the industry profit is highest when firms i and j, i.e., the two most efficient
firms, enter into a technology sharing consortium. In order to obtain a complete ranking of all the
three coalition outcomes, let us define ∆3 ≡ Πjk −Πik which can be written as:
∆3 =
c (2γ − 1)
¡
c (306γ − 54)− γ2 (40γ − 54) + cγ2 (360γ − 645)
¢
2γ (8γ2 − 17γ + 6)2
(24)
The sign on eqn.(24) is ambiguous, but ∆3 ≥ 0 if:
c ≥ c ≡ γ
2 (40γ − 54)
(306γ (1 + γ2)− 645γ2 − 54) (25)
17Recall that an increase in c causes i’s R&D reaction function to shift positively, whilst those of the other firms
react negatively in our example.
18 See Horn and Persson (2001) or Straume (2003).
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If (25) holds, the ranking between industry profits for the three coalitions is:
Πij > Πjk ≥ Πik ≥ 0 (26)
If (25) is violated, the ranking of industry profit is:
Πij > Πik ≥ Πjk ≥ 0 (27)
To ensure that the coalition between firms i and j is the equilibrium technology sharing agree-
ment, we need to ensure that firms i and j cannot earn higher profits without a coalition. Define
∆4 ≡ Πiji +Π
ij
j −Πi −Πj . We can show the following:
∆4 =

















We have already seen that the non-cooperative R&D levels are strictly higher for firms i and j, but
the factor γ(2γ−1)2 is larger than
γ(8γ−9)
18 . To check that ∆4 > 0 first note that as γ →∞,∆4 → 0.
The area in which the equilibria that underlie ∆4 exist is given by
γ−2
6(γ−1) > c >
2(2γ−3)
8γ2−17γ−3 which
is the area between A and B in Figure 2. Evaluating ∆4 at a point on either of these lines reveals
that ∆4 > 0. Furthermore, from this point we have that ∂∆4∂γ < 0 so that ∆4 → 0 from above as γ
increases. Hence for parameter combinations of c and γ in the permissible range we have ∆4 > 0.
Hence, we have shown the main result of the paper that a coalition consisting of the two most
efficient firms will be the equilibrium coalition structure.
8 Welfare comparison and discussion
The outcome of a process of endogenous coalition formation is shown to be technology sharing
between the two most efficient firms. We now consider the effects that this will have on the
product market equilibrium and consumer surplus in this market.
We have shown above that of the three coalition outcomes the industry profit is highest when
the two most efficient firms enter into a technology sharing consortium, with Πij being strictly
larger than Πik and Πjk (see (26) and (27)). It can also be shown that the industry profit without
coalitions is strictly lower than the equilibrium coalition, since Πij > Π where Π = Πi + Πj +Πk
represents the non-cooperative case. Furthermore, it can be shown that Πjk > Π, but Πik may
be either higher or lower than Π. However, if (25) is violated with c < c, then we know that
Πij > Πik > Πjk > Π with industry profit in the equilibrium coalition being the highest of the
potential outcomes considered.
It is also easily shown that consumers’ surplus, given by CSmn = (Qmn)2 /2, has the following
ranking (for all c and γ):
CSij > CSik > CSjk > CS
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Consequently, when c < c the ranking of welfare is given by (this is the area between lines K
and A in figure 5):
W ij > W ik > W jk > W
where Wmn ≡ CSmn + Πmn. When c > c, we know that welfare is highest when the two most
efficient firms are allowed to share technology advancements, since W ij > W , and we know that
W jk > W . A complete welfare ranking in this case will be parameter specific.
In the context of the present model, we observe that there are no conflicting interests between
consumers and firms in terms of which coalition outcome is preferred provided that the ex ante
difference between firms, c, satisfies c < c. This is, perhaps, surprising since one hypothesis might
be that higher levels of R&D lead to higher consumers’ surplus and welfare, and we know that
the total level of R&D is in fact lowest with a coalition between firms i and j. The ranking is a
consequence of total output being Qij > Qik > Qjk > Q which is inversely related to total R&D.
The difference between total output in the three potential coalition outcomes is proportional to
the parameters c and γ, with Qij − Qik = γc and Qik − Qjk = γc. We need to look at other
factors to explain why consumers (together with firms and welfare maximizing authorities) prefer
the outcome with the lowest level of R&D expenditure.
As is well known from Bergstrom and Varian (1985), the Nash outcome of a class of games will
be independent of the distribution of the firms’ characteristics. In terms of the present game, the
total output in the final stage is independent of the individual firm’s ex post marginal cost and
depends only on the sum of the firms’ ex post marginal costs, since Q = (3− (bci + bcj + bck)) /4.
This implies that it is not the total R&D effort that matters, but the effective reduction in the sum
of marginal costs that results from the R&D activities. Since there are perfect spillovers within a
coalition which adds to the benefit of R&D, the effective reduction in marginal costs will depend on
whether there is a coalition and which firms enter into a technology sharing coalition. The effective





the case of a coalition between firms m and n, where firm p is the outsider. It can easily be shown
that the effective reduction in the sum of marginal costs is highest when firms i and j enter into
a coalition, and that the rest of the potential outcomes confirms the consumers’ surplus ranking.
Consequently, even if the total level of R&D is lower in all of the three potential coalitions the fact
that each unit of R&D undertaken by the coalition partners effectively counts twice.
In the analysis we have assumed that only two firms can enter into a coalition, but it may also
be of interest to see if allowing all three firms to enter into a coalition may have an effect on the
outcome. We still maintain the assumption that firms only share the technology advancements
from stage 1 of the game, and that they undertake their investment choices non-cooperatively and
there is no cooperation in the product market. In this case, the R&D investment undertaken by
the firms benefit all coalition partners equally due to the assumption of perfect spillover, and the
investments will naturally not yield a competitive advantage. The perfect spillovers also imply that
16
the free-rider problem is pronounced, and it can be shown that the total level of R&D investments
in the monopoly coalition is only one third of the total R&D investments without coalition. When
all three firms agree to share their technology advancements this implies that the effective reduction
in the sum of marginal costs, and thereby the total output, will be identical to the no-coalition
case. Consequently, consumers will be indifferent between a coalition involving all three firms and
no coalition. It can also be shown that the equilibrium coalition of the two most efficient firms will
dominate the coalition of all three firms.
9 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have addressed the issue of cooperation in R&D strategy between heterogeneous
firms by allowing endogenous coalition formation. When the two most efficient firms join together
and share technological breakthroughs, it is not possible for the outsider to offer either of the
partners a better deal. In addition the partners prefer sharing their technology over the initial non-
cooperative situation. Hence this is the technology sharing agreement that will arise endogenously.
Moreover, we have shown that this agreement also maximizes the total welfare in society.
In terms of the welfare ranking of the outcomes, we have seen that the virtue of perfect spillover
is to add additional benefit to a coalition by in essence double the impact of any R&D undertaken
by firms in a coalition. If the coalition partners enjoy less than perfect spillovers, then the results
with respect to the welfare ranking could be changed. This is, in particular, the case with spillovers
close to zero. In such a case, the value for society in terms of added consumers’ surplus of allowing
a coalition is low. Nevertheless, if the coalition is costless for a participating firm it may still
choose to agree to such a coalition even with very low spillovers, provided that the cost advantage
of the firm over its rivals is not deteriorated. Furthermore, we have assumed a fixed ex ante cost
difference between firms which facilitates the analysis, but implies some loss of generality.
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Figure 5: Welfare comparison
12 Appendix
The equations of lines A, B, C and D in Figure 2 are:
A : c =
4γ − 6
8γ2 − 17γ − 3
B : c =
2− γ
6 (1− γ)
C : c =
γ (γ − 3)
14γ2 − 5γ − 3
D : c =
γ (γ − 3)
22γ2 − 22γ + 3
The equations of lines E, F and G in Figure 3 are:
E : c =
γ(2γ − 3)
12γ2 − 23γ + 6
F : c =
γ(γ − 3)
(3− 10γ)(2− γ)
G : c =
4γ − 6
8γ2 − 9γ − 6
The equations of lines H and J in Figure 4 are:
H : c =
γ(3− 2γ)
16γ − 12γ2 − 3
J : c =
3γ − 6
8γ2 − 23γ
The equation of line K in Figure 5 is (the equations of lines A and B are given above):
K : c =
γ2 (40γ − 54)
(306γ (1 + γ2)− 645γ2 − 54)
22
